Intellectual property litigation reflects competition and conflict. Firms competing in research and production often infringe, or directly challenge, each other's patent rights. Firms face the decision to file a legal suit, and following that, either to resolve their differences in pre-trial settlement negotiations or to take the expensive route of going to trial. An empirical analysis of how these choices are related to the characteristics of intellectual property assets and their owners, and to industry structure, offers a potentially useful window through which to view strategic interaction among firms.
We take an initial step here, by providing a broad-based statistical characterization of patent cases filed in the United States. The results are encouraging -we find that the frequency of legal disputes is strongly correlated with a variety of characteristics of innovations and their owners in a way which is consistent with existing hypotheses in the industrial organization, and law and economics, literature. Two examples illustrate this point. The first is our finding that patentees are more likely to go to court to protect patents that form the base of a cumulative chain, or technological trajectory. This suggests that the ability of firms to appropriate rents from their subsequent, "improvement" inventions, either through direct manufacturing or licensing, hinges on their control over the initial invention. This finding is consistent with the theoretical literature that emphasizes the link between patent rights and bargaining in contractual arrangements between first and second-generation innovators (Scotchmer, 1991; Green and Scotchmer, 1995) .
The second example concerns our finding that reputation building plays a role in the decision to litigate. Specifically, corporate (but not individual) patentees are much more likely to prosecute the infringement of a patented innovation when subsequent citations to that patent come from firms active in closely related technology fields. But when such technological "overlap" is smaller, and thus there is less benefit to building a reputation for aggressively protecting property, we find that firms are no more likely to litigate than individual patentees. Of course, in order for reputation building to be effective, it must be the case that litigation itself conveys information to competitors about the willingness to defend the patent. We find some supporting evidence: a patent is significantly more likely to be cited by other inventors shortly after it is litigated as compared to other patents of the same age involved in litigation longer ago (we call this the "publicity effect").
These findings together suggest that the burden of enforcing property rights is more severe for certain types of patentees. If pre-trial settlements are facilitated by cross-licensing and other types of patent portfolio exchange, or if the benefits of litigating one patent spill over to the protection of others through reputation effects, then enforcement considerations alone would make the same patent worth more in the hands of a large firm than a small one.
2 We find evidence that both of these factors are at work: Lower litigation rates for corporate relative to individual patentees suggests advantages in settlement (since their costs of litigation are almost certainly lower), and higher litigation rates for corporate patentees when later inventors who cite them are working in similar technological areas suggests reputation effects. Since it is common that intellectual property is the key asset of start-up firms, high enforcement costs may especially weaken their incentives for R&D and entry.
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These findings provide new, and in some cases the first, empirical support for these, and other, hypotheses related to R&D and industrial organization. Further progress in understanding how firms interact while trying to appropriate the value of their intellectual property will require that the litigation and patent data used in this paper be complemented by data on the outcomes of patent suits and firm-specific information such as size, cash flow, R&D, stock market valuation and licensing patterns.
There is a second reason to be interested in patterns of patent litigation. Innovation is at the heart of productivity growth, and granting inventors property rights through the patent system is the most widespread policy to encourage innovation. Yet, outside of the field of pharmaceuticals, research oriented 2 There is evidence that small biotechnology firms design their R&D strategies to avoid conflict with larger firms and that smaller firms rely more heavily on trade secrets than on patents for protection (Lerner, 1995a) . 3 Models of Schumpeterian growth, which require the appropriation of innovative rents, assume costless enforcement of these property rights (Aghion and Howitt, 1998) .
firms consistently report that they rely heavily on other mechanisms to appropriate the returns to innovation (Levin, Klevorick, Nelson and Winter, 1987; Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 1999) . Evidence from econometric studies using patent renewal and application data shows that that the implied, average 'subsidy rate' to R&D provided by patent rights are only on the order of 15 to 30 percent (for a review, Lanjouw, Pakes and Putnam, 1998) . It is important to understand why the main policy instrument to encourage R&D investment is not more effective than these studies suggest. Given the huge sums involved in some well-publicized cases, the cost of enforcing patent rights is certainly one candidate explanation.
It is clear from our data that litigation can be a very real part of extracting returns from patented innovations. But the importance of litigation is missed if one focuses only on average litigation rates. This should not be surprising, since it is well documented in the literature on innovation that there is substantial heterogeneity in the value of patents. What is interesting is that the heterogeneity is clearly reflected in the variation across patents in their exposure to litigation risk. Although the average litigation rate is only about one percent, patents with more claims and more citations by subsequent patentees are substantially more likely to be involved in litigation in each of the four technology fields we study. For the most "valuable" drugs and health patents, the estimated probability of litigation during the lifetime of the patent is more than 25 percent, and more than 10 percent in the other technology fields. As a percentage of utilized patents, these litigation rates would be even higher.
Very little is known about the costs of enforcing patent (and other intellectual property) rights. To make an economic assessment, three types of information are needed: the probability of litigation, the pattern of outcomes (settlement rates and win rates in trials), and the costs of settling and going to trial. As a first step, in this paper we calculate the probabilities that patents with different characteristics will be involved in litigation. In order to assess the overall burden of enforcement costs, and thus to estimate the net incentives being generated by the U.S. patent system, this information needs to be supplemented by analysis of how these characteristics influence the pattern of outcomes, and the costs of settling or going to trial.
The results in the paper point to some possible remedial actions. The rate of litigation in all of our broad technology areas is far lower than that estimated by Lerner (1995a) The market for intellectual property insurance can be made more efficient if insurance companies (and patentees) were better able to identify the risk associated with different "profiles" of patents and set prices accordingly.
The data set we construct for this paper is unique in two respects. First, we have linked information on patent suits (case filings) from the U.S. court system to the detailed information about inventions and their owners found in patent documents. This provides a very rich data set covering about three-quarters of all patent suits filed in the U.S. during the period 1975-1991. Matching court data to patent information enables us to construct a control group of patents. Rarely does one have information both about litigants and about the population from which potential litigants are drawn. Court data alone contain information on lawsuits, but no information on the potential population of disputes. It is only by using both the litigated and control groups that we can identify how the characteristics of patents and their owners differ between those that are involved in court actions and those that are not.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 summarizes hypotheses about the determinants of 4 On mediation requirements, see Farber and White (1991) .
litigation derived from existing theoretical literature, which are used as an organizing framework for the subsequent empirical discussion. Section 2 describes the construction of the new data set. In Section 3 we describe characteristics of the data and discuss which hypotheses in the literature are consistent with the evidence. In this section, we aggregate the information on patent infringement suits where the patentee is the plaintiff, and patent invalidity suits where the patentee is the defendant. There are no important qualitative differences in the results for each taken separately. Section 4 presents an econometric analysis of the determinants of infringement and invalidity suits, treated separately, as well as estimates of litigation probabilities for patents with different characteristics. Brief concluding remarks summarize directions for future research.
Determinants of Litigation Activity
Existing theoretical models identify the following four key determinants of litigation. (For an excellent survey, see Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989.) A. The probability of litigation increases in the likelihood of a potentially litigious situation, or 'event', occurring and being detected by the plaintiff. In our context, an event is any action which could be considered an infringement of patent rights.
B. The probability of litigation is increasing in the asymmetry information or the divergence in parties' expectations regarding the outcome of a trial. In our context this is more likely in emerging technology areas (e.g., biotechnology); where patent protection is new (e.g., computer software); or where legal procedure itself is changing.
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C. The probability of litigation rises in the size of the stakes. In our context, this includes the value of the patent right and any indirect benefits to filing a case (e.g., to strengthen reputation and bargaining power in subsequent interactions).
5 In strategic models of litigation, the likelihood of litigation depends on the information available to parties and the sequence of offers (Bebchuk, 1984; Png, 1983) . For discussion of the evolution of legal rules for
D.
The probability of litigation declines in the cost of trial relative to the cost of settlement. In our context differences are likely to arise between domestic and foreign patentees, and corporate versus individual patentees.
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Often the first defense against being sued for the infringement of a patent is to counter sue with a claim that the patent is invalid. Challenging validity may also be done preemptively. The four generic factors above would influence the probability of both patent infringement and challenge suits. However, there is an important difference between these two types of litigation: successful challenges of validity generate positive externalities while infringement suits do not. If a firm suing for invalidity is active in related R&D, it may be well-placed to benefit if the disputed patent is declared invalid or is restricted in scope. But other R&D-performing firms may also innovate in any technology space opened up, and all firms would be able to use the original innovation freely. By contrast, the gains from a successful patent infringement suit accrue primarily, if not exclusively, to the patentee. Besides making infringements suits more frequent than challenges, this argument implies that the four factors listed above should increase the probability of infringement suits (at the margin) more than patent challenges (for evidence, see Section 4).
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis, one clarifying remark is in order. Here we analyze the incidence and characteristics of case filings. The vast majority of patent cases do not reach the final stage of a trial judgement. Thus, from the point of view of assessing the overall costs of enforcing patent rights we expect that understanding why patent disputes get into the first rounds of court proceedings may be at least as important as understanding why they go to trial. Often the factors listed above are used to explain whether disputes fail to settle in the negotiations after case filing. However, expectations about the outcome software patenting, and the uncertainty it created, see Samuelson, Davis, Kapon and Reichman (1994) . 6 Legal costs are probably higher for foreign firms. Even if they engage domestic legal representation, they incur higher costs in communications and in translating business documents into a form which will be understood by a U.S. court. Legal expenses are also likely to be higher for smaller firms and individuals because of higher financing costs and their greater reliance on external legal counsel (Lanjouw and Lerner, of the post-filing stage will affect the earlier decision to file a suit and therefore this decision too would be influenced by the same factors. (For strategic models of litigation, see Shavell, 1982; P'ng, 1983; Hughes and Snyder, 1989.) 
Description of the Data
The data source used to identify litigated patents is the Patent History CD-ROM produced by To create a control group, we generated a 'matched' set of patents from the population of all U.S.
patents (both litigated and unlitigated). For each litigated patent, a patent was chosen at random from the set of all U.S. patents with the same application month and a common 4-digit International Patent Classification 1996). 7 The variables included the method of disposition of the case, the type of judgement, the percentage of large (greater than ten million dollars) monetary judgements received, and the party favoured in cases (IPC) sub-class assignment, described below. By constructing the population sample in this way, the comparisons we present between litigated patents and matched patents control both for technology and cohort effects. We obtained information on a range of characteristics for each litigated and matched patent, which we now briefly describe.
Number of Claims:
A patent is comprised of a set of claims which delineate the boundaries of the property rights provided by the patent. The principal claims define the essential novel features of the invention in their broadest form and the subordinate claims are more restricted and may describe detailed features of the innovation claimed. The patentee has an incentive to claim as much as possible in the application, but the patent examiner may require that the claims be narrowed before granting.
IPC Assignments: Each patent is assigned by the patent examiner to 9-digit categories of the IPC system. Our data contain assignments at the more aggregated, widely used, 4-digit sub-class level (614 subclasses). The IPC is a technology-based classification system and patents may be assigned to more than one sub-class. In the empirical analysis, we use the set of all 4-digit IPC sub-classes to which each patent was assigned.
Citations: An inventor must cite all related prior U.S. patents in the patent application. A patent examiner who is an expert in the field is responsible for insuring that all appropriate patents have been cited.
Like claims, the citations in the patent document help to define the property rights of the patentee. For each patent in the litigated and matched data, we obtained the number of prior patents cited in the application (backward citations) and their IPC sub-class assignments. We obtained the same information on all subsequent patents which had cited a given patent in their own applications, as of 1994 (forward citations).
For recent patents there is substantial truncation in the number of forward citations, since citation lags can be long (Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1996) , and we adjust for this fact in the analysis. For older patents there is considerable missing information on the IPC sub-class assignments of backward citations, as comprehensive were a final judgement was rendered.
IPC data are only available from about 1970, but the number of backward citations is complete for all patents.
Ownership: Nationality and type of ownership (corporate or individual) are constructed as follows.
We classify the inventor as domestic, Japanese or other foreign, based on the inventor's address. The nationality of the assignee is defined in the same way. About 66 percent of litigated and 73 percent of matched patents have an assignee. The nationality of patent ownership is that of the assignee, if there is one, and otherwise it is the nationality of the inventor. Nearly all assignees are firms (inventors are individuals), so we identify a patent as corporate-owned if there is an assignee.
Case Type: We have no direct information on whether a filed case is an infringement suit or a patent challenge. However, we were able to identify the patent owner as either the plaintiff or the defendant for about two-thirds of the suits in the data set. Among these, the patent owner was the plaintiff 84 percent of the time, which we interpret as infringement suits. The other cases, where the patent owner was the defendant, are almost surely suits for patent invalidation brought by competitors.
These variables relate to the key determinants of suits as follows: 8 (i) the number of potential disputes -is measured by the number of claims in the patent, the diversity of technology classes into which the patent falls, and the technological similarity of future patents that cite the original one; (ii) the size of the stakes -is measured by the number of future citations the patent receives, and the extent of self-citation (as an indicator of the firm's cumulative investment in that technology); and (iii) the cost of prosecuting a suit and asymmetric information -are inferred from whether the patent ownership is individual or corporate, and domestic or foreign.
The Frequency and Characteristics of Suits

Prevalence of Litigation
Panel A of Table 1 provides estimates of the number of cases which have been or will be filed per thousand patents applied for during the period 1980-1984, broken down by technology field and ownership.
For example, the aggregate figure of 10.7 means that for every thousand granted patents applied for during the years 1980-84, they will eventually become the subject of 10.7 filed cases. 9 It is an estimate because of the need to adjust both for the under-reporting of cases (discussed in Section 2) and for truncation.
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We need to make two calculations when constructing patent litigation rates by ownership (Panel B in Table 1 ). As in the aggregate data, we must adjust for truncation. 11 Second, to compute total patents in the denominator, we must impute the country of ownership from information on the country of first application (priority country). Inventions are often patented in multiple locations but, with few exceptions, the priority country is the country of the inventor. 12 Most exceptions involve cases where a foreign patentee chooses the U.S. as the priority country. Thus the share of total patents with domestic owners is slightly over-estimated and, as a result, the filing rate is understated for domestic patentees and overstated for foreign owners.
Despite this bias, domestic-owned patents are far more frequently involved in litigation. The aggregate litigation rate is nearly five times as large for domestic patentees, and this finding holds (with some variation) in all five technology areas. However, although domestic-owned patents are more likely to be litigated, they are not more likely to be litigated more than once. Among litigated patents the mean number of cases per patent is 1.39 (0.02) for domestic owners, 1.30 (0.10) for Japanese owners and 1.53 (0.10) for non-Japanese foreign owners. (Throughout the paper, figures in parentheses are standard errors.)
These means are not statistically different from each other at the 0.01 level. Thus, the nationality of the patent owner influences the probability of litigation, but not the number of times that a given patent is litigated. This finding is consistent with there being a fixed cost to litigating a given patent, which is higher for foreign firms, but it is not consistent with the idea that foreign firms are at a disadvantage in detecting infringements in the U.S. market since, if that were true, we would also expect the number of cases per litigated patent to be lower for foreign firms.
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There are also pronounced differences in litigation rates across technology fields, holding ownership constant. The most notable are the very low litigation rate for chemical patents and the high rate for drugs and health. There is a cased filed for every fifty drug patents. This may reflect the fact that patents are relied upon more frequently to protect pharmaceutical innovations, as confirmed by survey evidence (Levin, et. al., 1987; Cohen, et. al., 1999) . In addition, some of differences in litigation rates may be associated with variation in the value of patent protection. (See Lanjouw, 1998, and Schankerman, 1998, for evidence of differences in the value of patent rights across technology areas.)
The litigation rates in Table 1 are much lower than those presented by Lerner (1995b) for patents in the relatively young field of biotechnology. Based on a sample of 530 biotechnology firms, he estimates that there are about sixty cases per thousand U.S. corporate biotechnology patents. In other words, in biotechnology the rate of litigation is at least four times as large as it is for patents as a whole, and more than other leading OECD countries include: France, 84 %; Germany, 88 %; the U.K., 83 %; and Japan, 87 %. 13 An alternative to the fixed cost interpretation is that there are two types of foreign patent owners, those with low costs of detecting infringement and litigation (for example, owners with a domestic presence by virtue of a local subsidiary) and those with high costs. If most foreign patent owners are of the first type, the probability of litigation will be low. But the low-cost type will be highly represented among the foreign patent owners who do get involved in litigation, so the frequency of cases, conditional on a first filing, may be high. This is consistent with plaintiffs being better able to appropriate the gains from successful infringement suits, as compared to patent challenges.
Patent Citations
14 This understates the difference between individual and corporate behavior because there may be a third party (parent company, exclusive licensee or joint venture partner) representing an individual patent owner in a suit.) We find third party litigants for 53 percent of patents owned by individuals (26 percent of corporate-owned patents). Even in the 47 percent of cases where an individual owner is identified as one of the litigants, firms act as co-litigants in roughly half the cases. Thus, individuals appear to actual litigate alone in only about 25 percent of cases which involve individual ownership. 15 The unclassified category refers to cases where the patent owner is neither the plaintiff nor defendant. Under U.S. patent law, an exclusive licensee can sue for infringement on behalf of the patentee, but the defendant in a challenge suit must be the patent owner. Thus we conclude that the unclassified category is Future citations received by a patent (forward citations) are one indication that an innovation has contributed to the development of subsequent inventions. For this reason, citations have been used a measure of the value of an invention (Trajtenberg, 1990a and 1990b) and to trace and measure the effects of R&D spillovers (Jaffe, Henderson and Trajtenberg, 1993; Caballero and Jaffe, 1993) . We use citations to investigate whether the value of patents is systematically related to litigation.
The link between citations and litigation in these data is striking. Litigated patents are much more frequently cited than a randomly chosen patent. The mean number of citations among the litigated patents is 11.9 (0.2), but only 5.8 (0.1) for matched patents. This is partly because domestic-owned patents tend to be more heavily cited and also form the bulk of the litigated sample. In the matched sample, domestic-owned patents are cited 6.3 (0.16) times on average, compared to 4.8 (0.19) citations for non-Japanese foreignowned patents and 5.8 (0.32) for Japanese-owned patents. However, litigated patents are more heavily cited even when we control for ownership (Table 2) . We can easily reject a null hypothesis that litigated and matched patents have the same distribution of the number of citations, both for domestic-owned patents and foreign-owned patents.
16 Considering Japanese-owned patents separately does not appreciably effect the results. Clearly, litigation is much more likely to be a feature of maintaining property rights for more valuable (heavily cited) inventions.
In Section 3.1 we argued that the lower litigation rate observed for foreign-owned patents was consistent with higher litigation costs per patent for foreign patentees, but not with higher detection costs for foreign owners. The mean citation figures in Table 2 cast doubt on another explanation for the lower litigation rate: that foreign-owned patents are simply less valuable. In fact, studies of the private value of patent rights in different countries have found that foreign-owned patents are typically more valuable than those owned by domestic patentees (Pakes and Simpson, 1989; Lanjouw, 1992; Putnam, 1996. primarily infringement suits brought by an exclusive licensee or the parent company of the patent owner. 16 Using citation categories of 0, 1-5, 6-15, 16-50, and >50, test statistics are χ 2 /6 = 190.8, p-value < 0.01, and χ 2 /6 = 492.9, p-value < 0.01, respectively. We have interpreted the empirical association between citations and case filings as reflecting the role of the 'size of the stakes'. This is the typical use of citations as an indicator. However, it is equally clear that someone is making those citations, and thus the fact that a patent has many forward citations may also be an indicator that it is subject to a greater level of competition. When the citations come from others innovating in the same area, there are likely to be many disputes over competing claims. We examine this hypothesis by noting that, when inventors are operating in the same area, their patents will tend to fall in technology classes more closely related to the patents they cite and those patents that cite them. To measure the technological "similarity" between a patent and one of its citing patents, we calculate the percentage of 4-digit IPC assignments of the citing patent which overlap with those of the patent itself. Our similarity index is the mean degree of similarity taken over a group of citations. 18 Similarity between a patent and its backward citations is measured analogously. Similarity measures the technological closeness of a patent to its children and its parents. We treat self-citations separately since, when a firm cites its own past patents, they are more likely to be technologically similar because they arise from the same research program.
For backward citations, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the similarity index is the same for litigated and matched patents (Table 3) . However, for forward citations, the similarity index for litigated patents is significantly higher than for matched patents. Both conclusions hold for self-cites and citations by others, and for domestic and foreign patentees. This evidence supports the idea that crowdedness in a research area contributes to litigation. It increases the number of actual disputes, which could have a direct effect on the level of litigation, and also the number of potential disputes, and therefore, the importance of building a reputation for being willing to go to court.
Patentees are more likely to bring suits when they have subsequent inventions in the same technology area. There is significantly greater technological similarity between patents and their future selfcitations among litigated patents than among the matched patents -0.67 versus 0.58 for domestic owners, 0.72 versus 0.63 for foreign owners. One interesting explanation for this finding is that greater similarity of future self-citations is an indication of cumulative or sequential invention. In such cases, the ability to appropriate returns from later inventions may depend on having effective proprietary control over the earlier invention. This can arise because stronger control of earlier inventions changes the bargaining position for subsequent licensing agreements (Scotchmer, 1991 and 1996; Green and Scotchmer, 1995; Merges and Nelson, 1990 ). This gives a firm trying to control a technology as it develops a strong incentive to prosecute infringers of the early patents. Not only does this increase the stakes of the dispute, but perhaps equally important in explaining suits, it is also likely to cause an asymmetry in the stakes. Protecting the early patent in a cumulative chain generates benefits for the other patents in the chain which can only be enjoyed by the patent owner.
We have reasoned that citations (as a measure of value) lead to patent suits. But when deciding which previous inventions to cite, the patent applicant (or patent examiner who screens the application) is faced with a large body of patents to search. When a patent is disputed, it may receive more attention and, as a result, more citations than it would have otherwise. Thus one might be concerned that the publicity generated by a patent suit leads to more citations, reversing the direction of causality. We tested for the presence of a 'publicity effect' as follows. Using only the group of litigated patents, we compute the mean number of citations received at various lags after the application date. The first column in Table 4 presents the mean number of citations at various lags, but including only those not yet involved in a first case filing by the time of the citation. For example, the value 0.96 at lag six indicates that, for patents which will eventually be litigated but which have not been involved in litigation by six years after application, the mean number of citations in that year is 0.96. The second column gives the mean number of citations T years after application for patents that were involved in a first case filing T-1 years after application. The following columns give the same figure when the first case filing date is progressively further from the year of citation. The final row of the table provides the mean of the preceding rows and gives clear evidence that there is a "publicity effect" associated with a patent dispute going to court. The mean number of citations for given lags is significantly higher in the two years following a case filing. The effect of the case filing wears off over time and by the fourth year after filing no longer increases citations. This shows that other parties are aware of patent litigation. This means that litigation may signal to others the willingness of a patent owner to defend his property rights, which underpins reputation building. However, while there is a publicity effect, it is much too small to explain the higher number of citations that we observe for litigated patents. The last row in Table 4 implies that the publicity effect raises the number of citations received by a litigated patent by an average of just 0.50, a half a citation. 19 The actual difference in the mean number of citations between litigated and matched patents is 6.1, so the publicity effect can account for less than 10 percent of the observed difference in litigation rates.
Patent Claims
The number of claims is another, underutilized, indicator of the 'bits of information' contained in a patent, and therefore its value. Supporting evidence for the relationship between claims and value is found in the fact that claims are positively correlated with forward and backward citation in all technology areas in these data (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999) , and also with R&D expenditures at the economy-wide level (Tong and Frame, 1994 In addition to being an indicator of patent value, the number of claims may be associated with the technology or product "space" being protected by the patent. A patentee making more claims runs a larger risk of conflict with competitors. For both reasons, we expect litigation to be more likely for such patents, and it is. Litigated patents have far more claims than matched patents, both when they are domestic-owned and foreign-owned. The differences are large and statistically significant (Table 2) , and are also evident in the median and mode. Not only is the mean number of claims larger for litigated patents, but the number of forward citations per claim is also higher, controlling for ownership (Table 2 ). Thus litigated patents have both more claims, and more valuable claims. Moreover, we cannot reject the hypothesis that, among litigated patents, domestic and foreign-owned patents have the same number of citations per claim. As in our earlier analysis of citations per patent, this highlights the self-selection at work among foreign-owned, litigated patents.
In Table 2 we also examine the number of prior patents cited per claim in the patent documents of litigated and matched patents (backward citations). Controlling for ownership, we find that a litigated patent is likely to cite fewer prior patents per claim than a randomly selected patent. A small number of backwards citations may indicate that the invention is in a relatively new technology area. In this situation there is little information available to either the patentee or his competitors about how the courts will view the claims made in the patent, increasing the likelihood of divergent expectations and, as a result, litigation. Lerner (1994) argues that patents with uses in many areas -"broad" patents -are faced with more potential infringers and are thus more likely to be litigated. He proposes a measure of breadth: a simple count of the number of 4-digit IPC sub-classes to which a patent is assigned by the patent examiner. Using a sample of biotechnology patents he finds a large, statistically significant positive relationship between the 20 An alternative hypothesis is that a small number of backward citations simply reflects a failure by the patentee to cite relevant patents, which leads to litigation. Under this "failure to cite" hypothesis, we expect to observe patent invalidity suits, not infringement suits by the patentee. Under the "new area" hypothesis in the text, the number of backward citations per claim should not be significantly different for infringements and challenges, but under the "failure to cite" hypothesis, backward citations per claim should be larger for infringement suits. There was no significant difference in any of the three ownership categories, thus supporting the "new area" hypothesis. This finding is not surprising since, under U.S. patent law, "gross negligence" in citing prior art is sufficient grounds for invalidating a patent (Merges, 1997, Chapter 7) .
Technology Classifications
probability that a patent is litigated and its breadth. We constructed his measure of breadth on our more comprehensive data and tested the hypothesis that the distribution of the number of IPC sub-classes to which litigated and matched patents are assigned is the same (see Table 5 ). We also found some significant differences in breadth, but they go the "wrong" way. It is the narrower patents which tend to be litigated more often. We interpret this finding as indicating that it is more difficult for a patentee to detect infringement when his patented invention is used in diverse technology areas. 21 Whatever the reason, it is clear that biotechnology is not representative in terms of the link between patent suits and breadth. Table 6 presents probit regressions relating the probability of infringement and challenge suits, separately, to the following regressors: the number of claims, forward citations per claim, backward citations per claim, the number of 4-digit IPC's to measure patent breadth, similarity indices for backward and forward citations to measure crowdedness, the percentage of backward and forward citation which is self-citation to capture cumulative technology, and a set of ownership dummy variables to allow for nationality and individual/corporate differences. In each regression, the sample includes the litigated patents of the indicated type plus all of the matched patents. Technology group dummies are included as controls since the 50:50 breakdown of litigated and matched patents by IPC group does not hold for these separate samples. The table presents the parameter estimates and the implied marginal effect of each variable on the probability of litigation for a randomly drawn patent in the sample. 22 Since the pooled sample has a high 21 We also developed a more refined measure of patent breadth, defined as one minus the maximum percentage of patent's 4-digit IPC sub-class assignments that fall into one of twenty-two 2-digit technology groups. This measure recognizes that 4-digit sub-classes may be closely related (a patent with three assignments all within chemicals is less broad by this measure than a patent with two assignments where one is in chemicals and the other in electronics). The point estimates again confirm that broader patents are less likely to be litigated, but the difference was not statistically significant in any technology group. 22 Where there are quadratic terms, the reported marginal effect includes the full effect of a change in the covariate. For the similarity of forward citation, the marginal effect indicated for the interaction is the full effect of a change in similarity for corporate owners. The marginal effect for ownership type k is the rate of litigation by construction, to obtain the marginal effects for a randomly drawn patent in the population, one must multiply the reported marginal effects by a conversion factor. These differ by technology group and type of suit and are given at the bottom of Table 6 . The methodology for the conversion is described in Appendix 2. The significance of variables and the relative size of their effects is preserved through this conversion, although magnitudes will depend on the specific population of interest.
Econometric Analysis
Thus we discuss general results with reference to the sample and then end with an example of marginal effects on the probability of litigation in a population.
Turning first to infringement suits, the results strongly confirm that the probability of litigation rises with the number of claims and forward citations per claim, and the effects are substantial. A 10 percent rise in the number of claims (1.0 claim at the mean) implies a 1.4 percentage point increase in the sample litigation probability. Since the mean litigation probability for infringements in the sample is 37 percent, this corresponds to a 3.8 percent increase. But the number of claims is very skew: a similar calculation shows that a one standard deviation increase in the number of claims increases the probability of litigation about 32 percent. One additional forward citation per claim raises the probability of an infringement suit by 8.1 percentage points, or 22 percent. A one standard deviation increase in forward citations per claim raises the probability of litigation by 35 percent. These findings confirm the importance of the value of a patent in determining infringement suits.
On the point estimates, the likelihood of an infringement suit declines with the number of backward citations per claim. This is consistent with the hypothesis, proposed in Section 3.3, that a small number of backward citations is an indication of patenting in a relatively new area and that the associated uncertainties lead to more frequent patent disputes. However, the effect is not significant.
difference between the probability of litigation given k and a weighted average of the probabilities of litigation given ownership type j, where the weights are the probability that a patent is type j given that it is not type k. Because characteristics of patents in infringement and challenge suits differ, we evaluate the marginal effects at the overall sample means for each covariate (see Appendix 1 for details). Thus the marginal effects correspond to a randomly drawn patent and can be compared between the infringement and There is no evidence that Lerner's index of patent breadth (NO4IPC) increases the probability of infringement litigation. On the contrary, the point estimate again indicates that "broader" patents are less likely to be litigated. But the effect is marginally significant and small: a one standard deviation increase in breadth lowers the litigation probability by only 3 percent.
The similarity of forward citations by others (SIMFWD) significantly raises the probability of infringement litigation, and the effect is substantial. Moreover, the effect of the similarity index is almost twice as large for corporate owners as for individual owners. A one standard deviation increase in the similarity index raises the sample probability of an infringement suit by about 10 percent for individual owners and 17 percent for corporate owners. Given the number of citations, greater similarity indicates a more "crowded" technology area. This causes litigation because it increases both the likelihood of disputes and the importance of reputation in dealing with disputes. Our finding that similarity increases the probability of litigation more sharply for corporate owners indicates that reputation concerns may be an important factor in patent litigation.
In Section 3.2 we suggested that forward self-citations for a patent (given its total forward citations) may be an indicator that the patent owner is engaged in subsequent inventions that build on this earlier patent and that, as a result, he would have a greater incentive to protect his property rights in this area. This hypothesis is supported by the positive and significant coefficient on the variable FWDSELF, the percentage of citations which is self-citation. The point estimate implies that a one standard deviation increase in this variable raises the probability of an infringement suit by 4.0 points, or 11 percent. At the same time, we find that greater backward self-citation (BWDSELF) significantly reduces the likelihood of litigation: a one standard deviation rise in this variable lowers the litigation probability by 4.4 points, or 12 percent. Greater backward self-citation in a patent indicates that an invention builds more extensively on one's own past research and is thus more likely to be a "derivative" invention. This evidence supports the idea that there is challenge regressions.
complementarity among technologically-related inventions in a firm's R&D portfolio, and that this raises the willingness to protect the property rights of inventions at the base of the chain.
In the simple comparisons in Section 3.1, we found that individual patentees litigated as often as corporate patentees. Since corporations are likely to have lower litigation costs, this finding suggested that corporations are better positioned to settle. The econometric results show that another factor may also be at work -reputation effects. When reputation is not at issue because no future citing patents come from the same technology area (SIMFWD=0), we again cannot reject the hypothesis that the litigation probability is the same for corporate and individual owners of a given nationality (χ 2 /3=7.34, p-value = 0.06). However, when reputation is potentially relevant (which we evaluate by calculating the effect of corporate ownership at SIMFWD equal to its mean value) we find that, among domestic patentees, corporate owners are much more likely to become engaged in a patent suit than individual owners (χ 2 /1=4.34, p-value=0.04). In short, there is evidence that corporations have both lower settlement costs and strategic incentives to litigate, and that the latter effect dominates for domestic corporate patentees in the United States.
As in Section 3, we can easily reject that there are no nationality differences when we control for Under this null, we obtain a point estimate of 0.14 for the factor of proportionality when estimated over all technologies (see Appendix 1 for details). This finding is not an artifact of the data generation process -e.g., that patents tend to have three infringement suits and one challenge. In fact, few patents in the data are involved in both infringement and challenge suits.
Clearly there is something to be explained. The simplest economic interpretation of this finding is that it reflects the positive externalities generated by a successful invalidity suit (since invalidation generates potential benefits for all competitors and users of that invention). Suppose, for argument's sake, that the probability of litigation is proportional to the expected benefits, as a reduced form representation of some underlying strategic litigation game. If a firm successfully challenging a patent can only capture a fraction α of the benefits, then the marginal effect on the probability of litigation of an increase in patent value would only be α percent as large for patent challenges as for infringement suits. Under this interpretation, our point estimate of α = 0.14 suggests that a plaintiff can appropriate about 14 percent of the benefits from a successful patent challenge. 23 This interpretation is consistent with the observation (Panel B, Table 1 ) that patent invalidity suits are much less common than infringement suits. Table 7 summarizes the how the estimated litigation probability differs for "low-value" and "highvalue" domestic corporate patents. At the mean profile, the estimated probability is 0.7 percent for all technology groups. For a patent with one standard deviation more claims, or forward cites per claim, this probability roughly doubles. With one standard deviation greater claims and cites per claim, the probability is more than three times the mean. In drugs and health, a patent with one standard deviation greater claims and cites per claim above the mean is more than four times as likely to be litigated, with a probability of 7.4 percent compared to 1.8 percent. The table also provides the estimated litigation probability for the patent in the sample with the maximum number of claims and cites per claim in each technology group. In the mechanical and electronic technology groups, the estimated maximum probability of litigation is about 10 percent. In drugs and health, the maximum is nearly 30 percent.
Concluding Remarks
To study patent litigation, we have linked detailed information from the U.S. patent office to data from the U.S. federal court system, and then constructed a suitable controlled random sample of the population of potential disputants. This approach enables us to give a broad-based, statistical picture of the relationship between various characteristics of patents and their owners and the likelihood that they become involved in legal conflicts.
The most important finding is that there is a relationship. It means, first, that although the rate of litigation is low overall, there is wide variation across patents in their exposure to litigation risk. For high value patents and specific types of patentees, the probability can be quite high and this can offset what would otherwise be the R&D incentive provided by patent ownership. That those at 'high risk' may be individuals or smaller firms in newer and more dynamic technology areas should be cause for concern, but the fact that they can be identified can help make this risk insurable. Given our evidence that the characteristics of patents are associated with their litigation risk exposure, the next step in assessing these risks and costs is to examine how these characteristics are related to whether suits proceed to actual trial, and the range of outcomes in trials. The construction of a large sample database of costs and how they differ across types of patentees would be a further important step in determining what patentees can expect to pay to enforce their rights. Such data might include the costs of monitoring competitors for possible patent infringements, the cost of negotiating and administering settlements, and the costs of legal services for a range of case types.
Economists have studied the strategic behavior of firms using data on pricing, product choice, R&D investment and other decisions. The results here suggest that court records can provide a new and useful challenge suit, relative to an infringement suit, does not itself depend on the value of the patent. Note: a The population probabilities are calculated as described in Appendix 2, using the sample marginal effects in the second column of Table 7 and conversion factors, K, at the end of Table 7 .
Appendix 2. Deriving Population Litigation Probabilities and Marginal Effects
Population Litigation Probabilities
We define classes using characteristics with respect to which the sampling was non-random: IPC groups, cohort, infringement suits, and invalidity suits. Let P(X i ) denote the population probability of litigation for a patent in class i with a vector of other characteristics X i , and let Q(X i ) be the corresponding probability in our pooled, litigated and matched, sample. P(X i ) and Q(X i ) differ from one another because the matched sample was constructed such that the overall litigation probability is fifty percent controlling for technology and cohort. The task is to infer the (unobserved) probability P(X i ) from the estimated value of Q(X i ).
We begin by determining to what extent the matched sample for a given class needs to be inflated in order to have it reflect the number of unlitigated patents in that class in the population. Let Q and P represent the aggregate sample and population litigation probabilities for a given class.
Q = L /(L+M s )
(A.7)
where L and M s denote the number of litigated and unlitigated (matched) patents in the sample (the latter contains only one or two litigated patents). The population probability is
P = L/(L+M p ). ( A . 8 )
The number of litigated patents, L, is the same in both cases since the sample contains all (reported) litigated patents, and M p is the number of unlitigated patents in the class in the population. Using (A.7) and (A.8), we can solve for the size of M p relative to M s . This yields Since, within a class, the matched patents are random draws, the distribution of characteristics X in the matched sample is the same as that in the population. Thus, the number of unlitigated patents with characteristics X i in the population, M p (X i ), is, in expectation, greater than that in the sample by the same inflation factor, K, defined above and so is equal to KM s (X i ). Letting L(X i ) be the number of litigated patents with characteristics X i , we can write the expected population probability of litigation for such patents as The last term in (A.12) is the sample marginal effect computed from the probit regression. Using (A.11), the term in square brackets is
dP(X i )/dQ(X i ) = K /[Q(X i ){1+ [(1-Q(X i ))/Q(X i )]K }]
2 (A.13)
